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1  Introduction  
Economic development and environmental issues have been linked to and translated into a 
global conceptual framework at the Rio Conference on the Environment and Development
1 
which was held in 1992.  The concept of "sustainable development" is central to this global 
framework.
2 
When we consider the topic of developmental and environmental 
responsibilities of the Rechtsstaat we have to focus on "sustainable development" from a 
national perspective.  
2  Sustainable development:  global reconciliation of environmental protection 
and development  
The conception behind "sustainable development"
3
 could probably be described as the 
most ambitious and complex goal which has ever been tackled at the level of practical 
politics and legislation.  The goal is to co-ordinate all economic and industrial activities on a 
world-wide basis to such an extent that the ecological side-effects are tempered and the 
environmental harm caused by these processes is reduced in order to actively promote 
sustainable development.
4
  Sustainable development in this sense  
1  On the outcome of the Rio Conference see Johnston The Earth Summit.  
2  For a discussion on the meaning of this concept, see Beyerlin Sustainable Development; Ginther and 
De Waart Good Governance 1 ff; Handl Specific Obligations 37 ff;  Pallemaerts International 
Environmental Law 1 ff; Wolf Haftung der Staaten 473, 579 ff.  
3  Definition in WCED Our Common Future 43.  
4  If one consider the developments in the aftermath of the Rio Conference, definitions which should 
explain the meaning of the concept "sustainable development" are still of a very general nature. In 
Brundtland Our common future (report) which provided the conceptual framework for the Rio-
Conference, "sustainable development" was defined as "development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs".  This 
definition relates to human activity in a very general and all-embracing manner.  It is an ethical 
principle which is not based upon a binding legal source or on actual economic relationships. This 
definition does, however, take cognisance of two aspects which have legal implications.  The  
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refers to development which is not at the cost of future generations.  Article 4 of the Rio 
Declaration
5
 expresses this ambitious aim in simple words:  
In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall  
constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be  
considered in isolation from it.  
2.1  A common cause for the northern and southern hemisphere  
The outcome of what was decided at the Rio Conference could be summarised by three 
common causes which were endorsed by all states of both the first and the third world.  
Firstly, environmental protection is not only a dilemma of the industrial nations. It is just as 
much a problem confronting the developing countries.  Today governments as well as 
politicians in both the first and the third world know that a similar or comparable 
industrialisation of the southern hemisphere on the basis which it took place in the northern 
hemisphere during the last 150 years is utterly unfeasible. An ecological disaster on a 
global scale would be unavoidable.  To put it differently, the industrialised nations and the 
developing countries are in the same boat when it comes the twin concept of further 
economic development and simultaneous environmental protection which is captured by 
the concept of "sustainable development".
6 
 
Secondly, the economic and ecological aspects relating to the development of a country 
can no longer be separated.  It concerns two sides of the same coin.  Today economic 
policy which does not take ecological aspects into consideration is as unrealistic as it is 
irresponsible.  Similarly, solutions to ecological jeopardy are not possible without due 
consideration of economic developments.  In other words, both  
first relates to the fact that the actual effect of industrial activities which cause harm or damage to the 
environment are legally addressed according to the causative principle (Verursacherprinzip). The 
second point underscores state responsibility for environmental protection which in principle has 
been recognised by all states.  
5  See Rio Declaration 1992;  also in Johnston The Earth Summit 117 ff.  
6  The great number of duties to co-operative for environmental protection purposes stipulated by the 
Rio Declaration is clear evidence of this assessment (see principles 5, 7, 9, 12, 14 and 27).  
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the state's economic policy and companies' commercial policies are confronted with a new 
dimension when it comes to planning and the calculation of costs.
7 
 
Thirdly, the states participating in the Rio Conference arrived at the conclusion that legal 
co-operation is required in order to find an acceptable solution to problems relating to 
development and environmental protection.  However, the consequences of the Rio 
Conference for environmental protection law have not been clarified and are subject to 
further analysis.  
2.2  The legal consequences of the Rio Conference  
At first sight, the outcome of the Rio Conference for international environmental law 
appears to be rather insignificant.  The Declaration of Rio is not a legally binding 
document.
8 
Agenda 21 or the "Earth's Action Plan" is also not a document which is legally 
binding.  Moreover, the legally binding Conventions on Climatic Change
9
 and Biological 
Diversity
10
 only have the character of a legal framework.  It is, therefore, of no avail to look 
for a direct contribution to a solution for environmental protection and development issues 
on the basis of a Rechtsstaat in any of these documents.  
It is nevertheless interesting that the global programme for "sustainable development" is 
implicitly based on the legal assumption that there is no inconsistency between the 
prevailing economic system, namely free-market capitalism, and global environmental 
protection.  This deserves attention because the existing economic system is founded upon 
a monetary structure which depends on constant economic growth.
11
 International free 
trade, the combat of protectionism, the equalisation of  
7  The economic impact of the concept of "sustainable development" has been analysed by Binswanger 
1995 ZfU 1-19.  His analyses shows that states as well as international organisations nevertheless 
have little interest in a all-encompassing calculation of costs in the context of sustainable 
development.  
8  Hohmann 1993 NVwZ 311-319. 9 FCCC Climate Change 851. 10 CBD Biological Diversity 818. 11 
The possibility of structural conflicts between the capitalistic free market system and the  
requirements for effective international environmental protection are also barely addressed in the 
economic field - see the informative study of Binswanger 1995 ZfU 4. Binswanger 1995 ZfU 6 pays 
special attention to the issues related to monetary policies which depend on constant economic 
growth.  See Schreiber Umweltprobleme for a discussion of the effects of socialistic economic 
systems on the environment.  
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agricultural products and industrial goods in the GATT as well as in the law relating to the 
WTO, global transport relations, open markets for the production and consumption of 
energy and the aim to keep down costs of energy and transport are secured on a global 
basis by means of multilateral as well as bilateral agreements. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that the basic premises of free market capitalism is endorsed unqualifiedly by Principle 12 
of the Rio Declaration in order to secure sustainable development:  
States should co-operate to promote a supportive and open international 
economic system that would lead to economic growth and sustainable 
development in all countries, to better address the problems of environmental 
degradation.  Trade policy measures for environmental purposes should not 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on international trade.  Unilateral actions to deal with environmental 
challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be avoided.  
Environmental measures addressing transboundary or global environmental 
problems should, as far as possible, be based on an international consensus.  
No state represented at the Rio Conference critically addressed the issue whether the 
effects of this economic system on the environment are compatible with the principles of a 
Rechtsstaat.
12
 It was more a question of the industrial nations and the developing countries 
being unanimous on the issue that problems relating to global environmental  
12  This approach is contrary to the practical politics of all the countries which are significant in a 
economic sense.  The programme of multilateral action and environmental protection measures 
which are based on the consensus of every member state are often not observed anymore when a 
state is of the opinion that it is exposed to by an environmental risk with which it can deal effectively 
on an unilateral basis. From the perspective of the Rechtsstaat principle, no objection can be made 
to such an approach.  According to the norms of the Rechtsstaat, the only requirement is that 
competent state organs should act in accordance with national law.  Collective measures in terms of 
international law only enjoy precedence over real risks of damage only under circumstances when 
such measures do in fact exist and are just as effective as measures in terms of national law. Very 
often these requirements are not fulfilled. In such a case, multilateral action and multilateral 
consensus remains a mere postulate.  With regard to unilateral state measures for environmental 
protection which are in conformity with the Rechtsstaat principle, international economic law has an 
uncovered flank.  How difficult it is to close such an uncovered flank, has been well illustrated by the 
history background of art XX GATT (1947). Fifty years after the adoption of this agreement this 
important exception relating to the legal system of  
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degradation could only be resolved technologically on the basis of the existing economic 
system.  The key to this is to be found in the concept of the "transfer of technology" from 
the industrialised countries to the developing countries.
13
  This idea unifies both aspects of 
the global environmental protection, namely environmental protection by means of the 
technique of avoiding further degradation of the environment and the decrease of 
disparities in standards of living between North and South by economic development. In 
other words, the message coming from the Rio Conference clearly has economic 
overtones.   
3 The level of state implementation  
With regard to the central issue of balancing economic development with environmental 
protection, the legal implementation of sustainable development is in the hands of the 
individual state governments.  Only the state governments are endowed with the powers of 
statutory and economic sovereignty which form the legal basis for effectively promoting 
sustainable development.   
Legislatures on a national level are of great significance when it comes to formulating and 
executing responsibilities associated with a Rechtsstaat. Since there are certain 
modifications to the basic framework of the implementing economic and environmental law 
in the European Union,
14 
I suggest that we focus on the law of the Federal Republic of 
Germany and European law binding Germany with regard to the responsibility of a 
Rechtsstaat for sustainable development.  
international trade law has not been very much clarified -in this regard, compare Walker  
Environmental Protection.  
13  Art 9 of the Rio Declaration;  Beyerlin and Ehrmann 1997 Umwelt- und Planungsrecht 356-361.  
14  For an exposition on European environmental law, see Frenz Europäisches Umweltrecht 1-75 and  
Epiney Europäischen Union 1-3.  
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4  The legal dimension  
Which challenges confront the Rechtsstaat when we focus on economic development 
which should also be acceptable from an environmental point of view? This inquiry causes 
unresolved difficulties for three reasons. Firstly, the concept of the Rechtsstaat has not yet 
been clarified in all its dimensions. We usually list the various components which are 
integral to this concept:  the guarantee of human rights, the separation of state powers and 
effective legal protection.
15
 However, we seldomly address the nature (or Wesen) of the 
Rechtsstaat as such.
16 
A comparison of the British concept of the "rule of law" which departs 
from the premises that the executive is bound by Parliamentary legislation,
17
 on the one 
hand, and the German constitutional state, resting upon the foundation that legislation 
should be in conformity with the norms of the Constitution and controlled by the (German) 
Federal Constitutional Court, also does not reveal much about the nature of the 
Rechtsstaat.
18  
 
The second difficulty concerns economic development.  Especially in a Rechtsstaat which 
presupposes an economic system free from state interference, the relationship between the 
state and economic life has not been clarified.
19 
Generally applicable rules pertaining to the 
conditions and the degree of state interference which might be acceptable to regulate the 
economy do not exist.
20
  The constitutional limits to such  
 
15  BVerfG 7, 89 (92 f);  BVerfG 65, 283 (290).  See also Ipsen Staatsorganisationsrecht Rn 648 ff. For 
an extended list of the various elements of the Rechtsstaat, see Sachs Grundgesetz Kommentar art 
20 Rn 77, 78. See also Lerche Übermaß und Verfassung 32.  
16  The thorough study of Kunig Rechtsstaatsprinzip 312 ff is an exception to the rule. Kunig analyses 
the being-a-Rechtsstaat of the Federal Republic of Germany according to the Constitution.  He rightly 
does not endorse an "abstract" notion of the concept of the Rechtsstaat.  
17  On the historic development of the rule of law in England, see Taswell-Langmead English 
Constitutional History 350 ff; Maitland Constitutional History of England 270 ff; Blackstone Laws of 
England 160; Dicey Law of the Constitution 39.  
18  See Blaau 1990 SALJ 88 ff;  Neumann Rule of Law 182 ff.  
19  The expositions on the economic system (Wirtschaftsverfassung) of the Federal Republic of 
Germany by Schmidt Öffentliches Wirtschaftsrecht § 3 at 65 ff; Stober Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrecht § 
5 at 63 ff and Weimar and Schimikowski Wirtschaftsrechts 13 ff have the following in common, 
namely that no constitutional proscription of a specific economic system exists and that the 
constitutional basis for commercial activity and the limits thereof are to be found in the fundamental 
rights.  
20  In art 109 s 2 GG, the German Constitution sets the standard for budgetary policies of the federation 
and the Länder that they should take due cognisance of the "requirements of [a] macro 
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regulation,
21
 should it be possible to define them, are often in opposition to political 
expectations for stimulating the economy. The higher the unemployment levels, the more 
intense becomes the pressure on the state to create jobs and to interfere in the free market 
system.  Environmental protection could therefore easily be misused as the basis for 
allowing the state to directly manipulate economic processes.   
The third difficulty is related to environmental protection and environmental law.  Not only 
the legal boundaries to state interference in economic processes have not been clearly 
drawn.  Even the inquiry why environmental law developed as a new branch of law and 
what it is that distinguishes it from other fields of law very much remain in the dark.  There 
are often no clear answers to the dilemma of finding a justification for environmentally 
motivated measures which affect economic freedom of individuals.  
It is therefore no easy challenge for a legal scholar to clarify how a Rechtsstaat could 
effectively facilitate sustainable development.  In a certain sense, one feels like the 
mathematician who tries to add up noughts to get the sum total of one.  
4.1  Rechtsstaat  
The Rechtsstaat is characterised by the fact that it is composed of various elements which 
stand in a specific relationship to the law through which the principles are  
economic equilibrium" (ie the "Erfordernissen des gesamtwirtschaftlichen Gleichgewichts").  In 
contrast to the fundamental rights which regulate state competencies in a negative sense, requiring 
organs of state authority to refrain from unjustifiably encroaching upon these rights and freedoms, 
this standard is directed at positive state action with regard to financial planning, obliging state 
organs to act in a specific manner.  The contents of this planning goal has not been defined at a 
constitutional level.  Art 1 of the Budgetary Stability Act specifies four criteria for these purposes, viz 
stability of the level of prices, a high level of employment, a foreign-trade equilibrium and constant 
economic growth.  Although these criteria are in principle not subject to critique, they have not 
contributed to clarify the constitutional basis of the economic system nor did they lead to the legal 
tightening of the criteria which enable state interference in commercial activities.  It seems, therefore, 
that these criteria are unsuitable to contribute to resolving the potentially explosive relationship 
between state responsibility for economic development on the one hand, and environmental 
protection, on the other.  
21  BVerfGE 81, 70-97 (85), (decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 14.11.1981);  Hufen 1994 
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2915;  Tettinger Art 12 GG Rn 179.  
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expressed. A Rechtsstaat is a state which is bound by law and justice both with regard to 
the manner in which it is structured and how it acts through its organs.
22 
 
The Rechtsstaat is often distinguished by the fact that there is a separation of the powers 
vested with state authority.  However, the emphasis is on the legal structure which 
guarantees that the separation of powers forms part of the Rechtsstaat concept.  The 
legislative power is separated from the executive and the judiciary, and as next step, the 
executive again from the judiciary.  This separation of powers constitutes more than a mere 
formal requirement for a legal order based on the Rechtsstaat. It is a prerequisite for the 
binding force of law and justice.  It is also an imperative that the Rechtsstaat can only "act" 
through the decisions taken by the executive and the courts.  The exercise of legislative 
powers is not part of governmental action and should it be attributed to the governmental 
powers, the separation of powers and the basis of the Rechtsstaat itself would no longer be 
secured.  In other words, should this happen, the Rechtsstaat would be perverted to an all 
encompassing executive power.
23 
 
The decisive question is:  what is justice in terms of the Rechtsstaat?  What are the general 
rules or "laws" of justice in a Rechtsstaat? As a first step the laws of justice have to be 
distinguished from the sum of existing parliamentary statutes. The statutes made by 
Parliament are only an attempt to formulate the general norms of justice for a specific state. 
The Rechtsstaat, though, departs from the ideal that the statutes which are adopted by 
Parliament should conform with generally accepted norms of justice.
24 
Let me illustrate the 
point with three examples:  
•  If the state tolerates crime and no longer exercises policing powers to prevent it or to 
prosecute crimes, the state is at risk to loose control over those areas where life is 
dictated by crime.  Furthermore, the state will have to accept that the threatened 
population living in that area will negate the prohibition of the use of  
22 See Stern Staatsrecht 781.  In terms of the Constitution, the Rechtsstaat consists of the following: the 
fundamental rights directly binding all branches of state power (art 1 s 3 GG), the separation of powers (art 
20 s 2 GG), the legality of administrative action as well as the binding force of law with regard to 
adjudication (art 20 s 3 GG).  This constitutional order is the warranty of the Rechtsstaat system. 
23  Stern Staatsrecht 786; Eichenberger Gesetzgebung im Rechtsstaat 40 ff, 68 ff. 24 Schmidt-Assmann 
Rechtsstaat §  
24 Rn 4.  
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force in social conflicts and the corresponding state monopoly to solve social 
conflicts by using force to protect themselves.  
• Should the state allow that the working population and consumers are commercially 
exploited by monopolies and uncontrolled competition of companies, the 
consequence will be that at a certain stage the closed-circuit commercial system will 
collapse. The confidence and trust of investors will disappear and they will be 
unwilling to risk their capital for new investments. Consequently the commercial 
basis of ordinary people is destroyed and simultaneously also their ability to 
consume products.  
 
• Similarly, when a state does not take precautionary measures to protect the 
environment and natural living conditions of human life, then it will be too late one 
day.  In this context, the precautionary rule has become a kind of "basic law for 
environmental protection".  This rule for environmental protection is different in its 
nature from other norms of justice relating to human life such as the prohibition of 
using force, including the prohibition of unjust enrichment. The legal responsibility 
with regard to environmental conservation is existential in the most basic sense.  It 
is a prerequisite for life.  Once the environment and natural living conditions in a 
state have been destroyed, only one solution remains:  to leave the country, or more 
extremely, to flee from it.  
 
All these examples relate to basic conditions of justice.  Should these norms of justice be 
transgressed, the bill with the consequences will inevitably be presented to us one day. We 
not only risk an increase of legal conflict, but chaos.  We know today that chaos is also 
governed by predetermined patterns: it is determined by the rules of survival of the fittest 
and chance or coincidence. Life according to the rules of chaos is the exact opposite of life 
according to the rules of justice.
25 
 
To a large extent the degree of the environmental degradation with which we are 
confronted today can be traced back to the false belief of lawyers that the norms of  
25  On the characteristic of law as a mechanism to create order, see Schmidt-Assmann Rechtsstaat § 24 
Rn 21; Stern Staatsrecht 767.  
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justice can be isolated from the rules of natural sciences relating to physics, chemistry and 
biology.
26
 The time has come that the jurisprudential basis of our law, including the norms of 
the Rechtsstaat, should take more cognisance of the law of nature. In other words, if a 
statute permits dangerous emissions which do not only lead to a temporary nuisance but to 
permanent ecological harm, this is contrary to the rules of justice which is one of the 
cornerstones of the Rechtsstaat. Such a statutory provision does not preclude ecological 
harm but in fact forms the legal basis for continued and increasing environmental 
degradation.  It would seem, therefore, that a more integrated approach to master the legal 
problems related to environmental protection is the proper point of departure for this 
evolving field of law called "environmental law".  
 
4.2  Environmental protection as a duty of the state  
Environmental law encompasses all legal sources which aim at controlling the technological 
and industrial civilisation in order to secure our natural living conditions.27  Environmental 
law is not restricted to statutory law and administrative regulations which have been created 
since environmental protection became popular.28  Insofar as existing sources of law 
permit activities which are counterproductive to environmental protection and endanger our 
natural living conditions,  
 
26 Every general law, be it in the form of parliamentary statutes or laws of nature (ie the laws of natural 
sciences), depends on causal effects which the human being can recognise but which he cannot 
change.  The statutes of a state which are adopted by a legislature constitute a special category of 
such laws.  These statutes are adopted by Parliament for a specific state and only find application 
within the sphere of its territorial and personal jurisdiction.  The inherent conflict between statutes and 
the laws of nature is nowhere better illustrated than in the case of environmental law.  Should the 
legislature adopt parliamentary legislation for environmental protection which ignores or negates the 
laws of nature (ie in physics, chemistry and biology), these statutes have no long-term perspective.  
At one or other stage the legislation will have to be amended, eg when the critical level which is set 
for regulating the drinking water quality is too low, nature will not recover sufficiently and the level will 
inevitably have to be adapted in due course. In other words, the belief that a state legislature could 
make generally applicable laws for all people by only taking its own perspectives and aims into 
account, does not correspond to reality.  If this misconception is not corrected, the Rechtsstaat will 
not be able to fulfil its obligations with regard to environmental protection.  
27  Hoppe and Beckmann Umweltrecht 23;  Oberrath Umweltrecht 17.  
28  This misunderstanding stems from the unquestioned definition of environmental law in Germany as a 
new and independent field of law. According to this definition, environmental law encompasses all 
legal regulations which serve environmental protection. Kloepfer Umweltrecht § 1 Rn 60 defines 
environmental law as "Sonderrecht der staatlichen Umweltschutzaktivitäten". Such a teleological 
definition is too restrictive in its conception.  It does not explain the complexity of the planning and 
regulatory character of environmental law.  
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they also fall within the scope of environmental law.  Logically the amendment of such 
legislation also forms part of environmental protection law.
29 
 
Taking the state of affairs with regard to the current developments on an economic and 
technological level into account, the responsibility for environmental protection 
predominantly rests upon the state.
30 
The state not only has to create the legal basis for 
future economic and technological developments which are compatible with environmental 
protection, but also has the duty to regulate environmental harm which has already 
occurred.
31
  In other words, the state has the duty to invoke measures which could help to 
neutralise such harm or to clean up or redevelop an area where an environmental disaster 
took place.  On closer examination, though, the true responsibility for environmental 
protection is not only directed at the state.
32 
Everybody who is in a position to cause harm to 
the environment carries the responsibility for it.  
4.3  Challenges to the "Rechtsstaat" with regard to "sustainable development"  
The most important difficulty facing a Rechtsstaat when it comes to the realisation of 
"sustainable development" lies in the structural differences between the constitutional order 
based on the Rechtsstaat idea, on the one hand, and the dynamics of political and 
economic planning, on the other.  
The basic structure of economic law in a free market system with constitutionally 
guaranteed rights of private persons is characterised by freedom from state  
29  See Kimminich Umweltschutzes 12.  
30  A more restrictive approach is endorsed by Kloepfer Umweltrecht § 1 Rn 24.  
31  See the Directive on Environmental Policy of the federal government which was adopted in 1971  
and is still applicable, BT Drs VI/2710.  
32  The reason for concentrating on environmental responsibility as forming part of the state's duties in 
both German environmental law and the first three environmental programmes of the European 
Council until the end of the 1980's can be historically and systematically explained.  From a historic 
perspective, the state is held environmentally responsible due to the fact that it over many years 
neglected the ecological harm stemming from industrialisation and economic development. From a 
systematic point of view, the reasons can be found in the changing relationship of the state vis-á-vis 
economic life. The greater the extent to which economic development is regulated in terms of 
statutes and administrative regulations, the more environmental law also becomes subject to state 
regulation although environmental protection is no longer based only on historic neglect.  
Prof J Wolf  PER/PELJ 1999(2)2 
34/89 
 
interference.
33
  In principle legislative measures and administrative regulations are restricted 
to providing a legal basis and ensuring a proper infrastructure for economic and social 
intercourse without regulating commercial activities as such.  The planning of trade policy 
measures by the state is subject to the constraints of the fundamental rights guaranteeing 
free commercial activity.
34
 A limitation of these rights may be justified under specific 
circumstances, for example when the measures serve innovative technological 
developments which are to the advantage of the whole economy.  On an all-over basis, 
however, commercial freedom takes precedence over planning policy.  
In environmental law the tables are turned:  the relationship between legally guaranteed 
freedom and the realisation of planning policy goals with the aid of regulations is often 
reversed.  In this instance, planning law is more predominant.
35 
The reason for this is that 
only measures falling within the scope of planning law are suitable to generally reduce 
environmental pollution which already occurred or to promote new technology which offers 
an environmentally friendly alternative.  
From the perspective of the Rechtsstaat concept, environmental problems can only be 
resolved with the aid of environmental-law measures.  The political goal to protect the 
environment often falls flat because there is no statutory basis authorising the state to 
regulate economic development.  However, with a too extensive regulation of economic 
and technological development, the Rechtsstaat would fail in its responsibility
36
 in a similar 
manner as it would when it follows an absolute laissezfaire policy with regard to such 
developments.  The challenge for the Rechtsstaat is to determine the most suitable legal 
measures which are indispensable to steer and  
33  According to arts 2 and 3 of the EC Treaty, the economic order of the EC is directed at the creation of 
a market where individual freedoms are guaranteed to all participants in the market, especially with 
regard to the free movement of goods under conditions of fair competition compare the decision of 
the European Court of Justice, of 19.03.1991, I ECR 1223, 1269 par 41 about telecommunication 
devices.  Due to the fact that European law enjoys precedence, the free market economic system is 
binding for all member states.  Therefore, the open-ended manner in which the German Constitution 
treats the economic system has no real implications for matters relating to the Common Market.  
34  Hufen 1994 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2915; Tettinger Art 12 GG Rn 180.  
35  Kloepfer Umweltrecht § 5 Rn 5; Erbguth Rechtssystematische Grundfragen 124; Hoppe and   
  Beckmann Umweltrecht § 7 Rn 1 ff.  
36  BVerfG 50, 290-381, (338), (decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 01.03.1979). See also 
Breuer Freiheit des Berufs § 147 Rn 20.  
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control economic activities in order to prevent environmental degradation. These duties of 
the state can best be highlighted with a few comments on the Rechtsstaat, economic 
freedom and environmental law:  
• In order to influence commercial activities and consumer attitudes, a clear 
distinction should legally be drawn between consumer goods which could be increased and 
regenerated and other goods which cannot.  The latter should be classified as public or 
environmental goods.
37
  In the absence of such a distinction, neither indispensable natural 
resources can be protected with long-term environmental measures, nor can the precise 
scope of economic activity which is affected be determined.  
 
• Due to the fact that natural resources are becoming more depleted environmental 
law is increasingly also understood as a mechanism serving the ends of fair distribution of 
these natural resources (that is distributive justice).
38 
Potential conflicts between the 
developmental responsibility and the environmental responsibility of the Rechtsstaat cannot 
be resolved without prior clarification what the concepts "distribution" and "scarcity" mean in 
a legal context.  Currently we can only quote economic explanations.  The economic 
premises departs from the assumption that there is no private ownership of natural 
resources and that market-related prices for natural resources cannot be determined.  It is 
controversial whether it is possible for the state to substitute market-related prices for 
natural resources by charging environmentally related fees for utilising these resources.
39 
This discussion shows that the traditional distinction between economic goods and 
services, on the one hand, and natural resources, on the other, is still appropriate and valid 
in both a legal and an economic sense.  It also sets limits to legal measures for the 
development of distributive procedures.  
•  
 
37 See Kloepfer and Reinert Umweltfragen 41 ff.  
38  Gethmann, Kloepfer and Reinert Verteilungsgerechtigkeit (fn 37).  
39  Kloepfer and Reinert Umweltfragen 43, 45 (fn 37).  
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•  Existing private and criminal law regulations should not be restricted or weakened only 
because they apparently impede economic and technological development. Especially 
restrictions to private property and the administrative treatment of jeopardy to people's 
health as a general risk of life should still be subject to control on a legal basis.  In other 
words, economic and technologicals development have to adapt to the rules of private 
and criminal law and not vice versa40 
 
• Should there be uncertainty about the ecological risks related to technical plants and 
dangerous substances, the planned commercial utilisation should be subject to prior 
administrative scrutiny.
41
  Three issues should be clarified during such an examination. 
First, does the uncertainty with regard to the risk lead to an unlawful hazardous risk when 
one carefully consider the degree of the risk?
42 
Secondly, is the risk connected with the 
utilisation - which otherwise would have been legally inadmissible -mitigated by technical 
and other precautionary measures to such an extent that the risk connected with such a 
utilisation is reduced insofar that it becomes legally admissible?  Thirdly, should the 
second inquiry be answered positively, which criteria should be invoked to determine the 
scope of the precautionary measures and who should carry the costs of it?  
5.  Possible solutions at a constitutional level  
During the mid-1980's a debate ensued whether environmental protection should be 
guaranteed in the Constitutional.  Finally, in 1994, article 20a GG have been inserted  
40  In the Civil Code (BGB) the law dealing with the law of neighbours the diametric opposite line has 
been endorsed.  According to a statutory amendment of 1994 (BGBl I 2457), German civil law 
regulating the level of emissions opted for the opposite approach.  In terms of § 906(1) BGB took the 
public-law critical values stipulated by the Federal Emissions Control Act and other environmental 
laws as a basis.  
41  Compare the licensing procedure in terms of the Nuclear Plant Act § 7; compare also the 
requirements with regard to the Environmental Impact Assessment (EC Directive 85/337); 
Environmental Impact Assessment Act (UVPG).  
42  The boundaries of illegality relating to risk without causing damage have not been clearly defined. 
So, eg, a violation of fundamental rights is assumed in the case of a mere risk when the highest 
possible standards with regard to the operation of a nuclear power station are not upheld compare 
the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in the Kalkar matter (BVerfG 49, 89 ff). In contrast, 
the standards are not that strict when it comes to gene-technological research.  
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in the Constitution (Grundgesetz) which formally stipulates environmental protection as a 
goal of the state.   
Since the adoption of the Uniform European Act, environmental protection measures found 
their way into the European Community Treaty
43
 as well.  These measures have twice been 
extended and intensified - both in the Maastricht and the Amsterdam Treaties.  However, 
none of these measures directly contribute to resolve the dilemma of environmental 
protection confronting a Rechtsstaat with regard to technological and industrial 
development and the dictates of constant economic growth.  
5.1  No environmental fundamental right  
The German constitutional amendment of 1994 deliberately did not take up environmental 
protection in the catalogue of fundamental rights.  During the preceding debate such a 
fundamental right on healthy environmental sources for everybody has often been 
demanded though.
44 
Should Parliament have taken this way, the legal protection for 
individuals in environmental-law cases would have been improved to a large extent.  Those 
who were against the incorporation of a fundamental right to a clean environment in the 
Constitution were afraid of leaving it to the courts to resolve conflicts on environmental 
protection and economic development.  Because no consensus could be reached on the 
exact contents of such a fundamental right its listing in the bill of rights has been thwarted.
45 
 
It is also not to be expected that a fundamental right guaranteeing a clean environment will 
be adopted in European law in the near future because a written catalogue of fundamental 
rights has not been incorporated in the European Union Treaty.  
Should such a fundamental right in fact have been incorporated in the German Constitution, 
the most important obstacle which currently stands in the way of effective constitutional 
protection of the natural sources for living would have been  
43  Art 130(r-t) EC Treaty.  
44  Steiger Mensch und Umwelt 62 ff, 73 ff;  see also Kloepfer Grundrecht auf Umweltschutz; for  
further references also Kloepfer Umweltrecht § 3 Rn 21 (fn 62 and 63).  
45  See the exposition by Peters 1995 NVwZ 555 and Henneke 1995 NuR 325.  
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eliminated.  Legal protection would have been guaranteed without requiring the individual to 
first prove a causal connection with the concrete harm to his/her health in a specific 
instance.
46
  In the case of a fundamental right guaranteeing the "natural sources of life", it 
would have been sufficient merely to establish that ecological damage took place in the 
vicinity where the plaintiff lives.  The state would no longer have been in a position to justify 
the limitation of the most general fundamental right in terms of the German Constitution, 
namely the right to general personal freedom (article 2 section 1 GG) on the basis of 
economic considerations.   
5.2  Article 20a as a state goal of environmental protection  
In terms of German constitutional law, state goals (Staatsziele) bind the legislature and 
should be translated into legislation. Article 20a GG which formulates environmental 
protection as a "state goal" reads as follows:  
The State, aware of its responsibility for present and future generations, shall 
protect the natural [re]sources of life within the framework of the constitutional 
order through the legislature and, in accordance with the law and principles of 
justice, the executive and the judiciary.
47 
 
As in the case of the constitutional goal of establishing a welfare state (Sozialstaat)
48
, the 
goal to "protect the natural sources of life" has been formulated in very general terms.  In 
principle, the legislature is only required to present a concept for a legislative programme to 
protect the environment.
49
  There are no legal sanctions available to enforce it.  Even the 
constitutional criteria to determine whether a "state goal" is thwarted have not been clarified 
with any agreed certainty.
50 
 
46  Brönneke 1993 Zeitschrift für Umweltrecht 1.  
47  The original German text is as follows:  "Der Staat schützt auch in Verantwortung für die künftigen 
Generationen die natürlichen Lebensgrundlagen im Rahmen der verfassungsmäßigen Ordnung 
durch die Gesetzgebung und nach Maßgabe von Gesetz und Recht durch die vollziehende Gewalt 
und die Rechtsprechung." The German concept of "Lebensgrundlagen" has been translated with 
"natural sources of life" in the official translation. "Resources" would perhaps have been a more 
appropriate translation to capture the spirit of the concept.  
48  In terms of art 20 s 1 GG.  
49  Bernsdorff 1997 NuR 332;  Schink 1997 DÖV 323.  
50  Some academics argue that art 20a GG at the very least constitute a general prohibition of a  
deterioration of the environmental status quo.  The guarantee of the status quo of the environment  
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The object and purpose of such a state goal to protect the environment is to create a 
constitutional framework which ensures that all essential developments in regard to 
environmental protection, including those areas which overlap with economic development, 
remain subject to legislative incentives and regulation. The fact that the German legislature 
is bound to respect fundamental rights does not really create any limitations which are 
worth mentioning when it comes to environmental protection.
51 
This was also clear from the 
debate whether or not to incorporate such a fundamental right in the Bill of Rights.   
However, as long as the legal protection of individuals relating to environmental-law issues 
is not put on a proper legal footing, the sensitive area of economic development in this field 
which is central to such disputes cannot be influenced by the courts.  This is particularly 
true with regard to harmful or dangerous emissions which pollute the air, water and soil. 
From a legal perspective, such emissions constitute a legal risk (Rechtsgefährdung) but 
cannot be classified as a concrete statutory transgression (Rechtsverletzung).
52 
In other 
words, because such harmful and dangerous emissions create a legal risk 
(Risikoverursachung) without causing damage (Schadensverursachung), legal protection of 
environmental sources fall between two stools.
53 
 
5.3  Open-ended constitutional programme  
In essence it is impossible to provide an answer to the inquiry on the nature of the 
relationship between economic development and environmental protection at a 
constitutional level.  The constitutions of all the countries which endorse the concept of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) show one similarity, 
namely not any generally applicable rules exist with regard to the influence  
would then have a constitutional basis, see eg Kloepfer Bonner Kommentar Rn 35 ff. However, 
should the environmental standards deteriorate, it is not clear what the legal consequences are. 
Experts, however, are indeed expecting such a deterioration of the environment.  
51  Murswiek Kommentierung zu Art 20a GG Rn 56;  Kloepfer Umweltrecht § 3 Rn 56.  
52  Regarding exceptions in cases of extremely high risks, e.g. the use of nuclear energy, see footnote 
42 above.  
53  Murswiek Kommentierung zu Art 20a GG Rn 63.  
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which may be exercised by any of these states on their economy.  Not even the extent of 
state participation in providing services or the number of state enterprises participating in 
the economy has been legally restricted.  To put it differently, the state's economic policy 
has deliberately not been made subject to any constitutional constraints with regard to its 
contents.  
For the same reason there are no generally binding limitations to the realisation of the 
state's environmental protection.
54
 The constitutions of the OECD countries deliberately 
does not set specific limits to the degree of admissible pollution or the extent to which 
environmental risks are permitted because this would have a detrimental effect on the 
open-ended manner in which the constitutions treat economic policy making.  
Critically considered this was also the gist of the debate on extending the German Bill of 
Rights to include a fundamental right for the protection of environmental freedom. In a 
certain sense the state goals which are formulated by article 20a GG resemble the playing 
of table tennis. The protection of the natural sources of life is stipulated explicitly in the 
Constitution in order to improve environmental protection but at the same time the ball is 
returned to the legislature.  In other words, the constitutional protection of the 
environmental is back in the hands of the legislature, leaving it a free hand with regard to 
the kind of legislation it may adopt to reach this goal.  
6  Precautionary principle  
On an all-over basis it seems fair to suggest that the most important contribution to get to 
grips with the responsibilities of the Rechtsstaat in promoting environmental protection has 
been made by legislative bodies in European as well as in German environmental law.  The 
legislative measures require that precautionary measures should be taken by those who 
cause the environmental damage or risk.
55
  Such  
54  Murswiek Kommentierung zu Art 20a GG Rn 60.  
55 Compare Federal Emissions Control Act (BimSchG) §§ 1, 5 I nr 1, 2 and the Federal Water  
Resources Act § 1(a).  
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statutory measures are increasingly invoked and form the basis for an emerging new legal 
principle, namely the precautionary principle.
56 
 
According to article 130(r) of the EC Treaty,  
… community policy on the environment shall ... be based on the precautionary 
principle and on the principle that preventive action should be taken.  
 
The distinction between precautionary principle and mere preventive action was introduced 
by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.  Legal protection prior to the new regulation in terms of 
the Maastricht Treaty placed the emphasis on mere preventive action.  Consequently, it 
appears that the recently introduced precautionary principle has been intended as a 
regulation in its own right and with a legal impact distinct from the rule simply emphasising 
preventative action.  
Mere preventive action refers to the protection of public security, including the protection of 
everybody's rights under circumstances where concrete a danger exists.
57 
Such a 
"concrete" danger is required to be of an immediate nature in the sense that an 
infringement of rights or a violation of the laws will definitely occur if the danger is not 
averted. Such protective and preventive measures are normally taken by the police force. 
In this regard, the police authorities act in a twofold manner according to principles of the 
Rechtsstaat. Firstly, the action of the police force serves the protection of law and freedom 
and in effect this constitutes the most important instrument for safeguarding public security. 
Secondly, the powers of the police force to take preventive action, including their 
discretionary powers to infringe upon the rights and freedoms of those who destroy or 
endanger public security, are restricted to situations of concrete and imminent danger. The 
assessment whether a "concrete" danger does exist under specific circumstances depends 
upon the general experience and on specific information held by the authorities.  The 
discretionary power of the police force in deciding whether a concrete danger exists is 
therefore subject to strict  
56  Lersner Vorsorgeprinzip 2703 ff.  
57  On the law of hazard prevention, see Di Fabio Risikoentscheidungen 35 ff.  
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scrutiny by the courts. The usual manifestation of a concrete danger with which the police 
authorities is confronted differs in two important respects from risks that are covered by 
environmental protection law though:  
1 The risk potential of certain kinds of technology (for example nuclear energy plants 
and biotechnology) or of specific substances (for example cancerogenic materials) is too 
high to be controlled only in terms of the standards invoked by police authorities.  
 
2 With regard to this higher level of risk potential, the legal standard for preventive 
measures is modified from a standard aimed at the prevention of damages to a standard 
which is directed at the prevention of risks.  In legal terms this has far-reaching 
consequences:  the requirement that a probability of damage exists is replaced by the 
possibility of danger of damage.  This latter condition is referred to as a "risk".  Risk in this 
context does not refer to a risk in a vague sense of danger that might result but to a specific 
legal meaning which is attached to it.
58 
The precautionary principle addresses the problem 
of safety standards and their implementation with regard to the risk of accidents in technical 
plants with unacceptable environmental consequences.  The main problem concerning the 
implementation of the precautionary rule is to find a key for attributing the costs for 
technical equipment to reduce dangerous emissions to either the plant operator, the state 
or both of them.  
 
Apart from preventing environmental accidents the authorities who are authorised to license 
and control technical plants also have to tackle the problem of reducing day to day 
emissions into the air, watercourses and the soil.  A single car driver's carbon dioxide 
emissions, for example, hardly cause an environmental risk.  But all car drivers together do 
cause a considerable environmental problem.  If you add technical plants and technical 
equipment in private households which produce similar air pollutants it escalates to such an 
extent that the scales are tipped towards the extremely serious problem of climatic 
changes.  The ways and methods invoked by legislatures to master these problems on the 
basis of the precautionary principle are very different in nature. We shall focus on two 
approaches, that is the procedural approach and the approach of setting specific technical 
standards.  
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6.1  Procedural approach  
Directives of European Community law treat the precautionary principle as a procedural 
approach.  The most important contribution in European law in this regard is the Directive 
on the Environmental Impact Assessment.
59
  All direct and indirect effects of a planned 
undertaking must be established for purposes of an environmental impact assessment.  
The effects are described in a detailed manner and are subsequently assessed.  In 
essence the procedure aims at preventing and reducing all potential risks and harm to the 
environment already at the stage before an operating license is issued.  
However, a central difficulty which has not been addressed and not yet solved by this 
procedure is that of defining specific precautionary standards.  It has been left to 
administrative practice to develop such standards.  
6.2  The approach of technical standards in terms of the precautionary principle under 
German law  
In terms of German law, the most important precautionary regulation can be found in the Air 
Pollution Act of 1974.  The Act stipulates that the owner of a technical plant is under the 
obligation to take precautionary measures to prevent environmental harm with the aid of 
instruments or mechanisms which correspond to the advanced techniques available for the 
limitation of such polluting emissions.  This provision is intended to solve the precautionary 
problem in a material sense by regulating the specific risk of a single plant in relationship to 
a given technical standard to prevent emissions.  It is not only possible but is day to day 
administrative practice in Germany to lay down specific technical standards for the 
reduction of dangerous and harmful emissions.  Should a plant owner be unable to fulfil his 
obligations with regard to the  
58  Di Fabio Risikoentscheidungen 73, 94.  
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implementation of the specified precautionary standard, the legal consequences are 
obvious, namely that the authority may not issue him with an operating license.  
However, there are two difficulties in existing precautionary legislation which cannot be 
disregarded.  First, the key problem remains that we are not yet in a position to legally 
relate a specific amount of emissions which is dangerous or detrimental to the environment 
with a specific number of precautionary measures which are necessary in terms of the 
precautionary principle to avoid environmental harm.
60
  In essence it boils down to the 
following:  instead of the amount of precautionary measures we could just as well speak of 
the costs related to the implementation of precautionary measures without changing the 
legal problem.  
Secondly, with regard to the issue of cost distribution there is no other option available in 
administrative practice for the time being than to apply well-known general formula, namely 
the test of reasonableness and the principle of proportionality.  In contrast to the traditional 
application of these rules and formula, the facts of environmental disputes are often not all 
that clear-cut.  This is due to the typical factor of uncertainty associated with environmental 
risks and jeopardy. In the context of the precautionary principle, therefore, the test of 
reasonableness and the proportionality rule cannot be applied in the usual way. This 
dilemma has not been resolved in German environmental law and is still debated.
61 
 
7.  Environmental quality standards  
A similar legal basis than the precautionary principle in environmental law does not exist 
with regard to state responsibility for economic development.  Compared to economic 
development, the law relating to environmental protection is not of a regulatory but of a 
planning-law nature.  This is illustrated very well by the  
59  UVP-RL 85/337/EWG. This directive was belatedly transformed into national legislation in  
Germany by the Environmental Impact Assessment Act of 12 February 1990.  
60 Ossenbühl Kernkraftwerken 54; Di Fabio 1996 Jura 572 f.  
61  See Di Fabio 1996 Jura 574 for further references.  
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environmental quality standards which found their way into German law via European law.
62 
 
The aim of environmental quality standards is to enable the legislature, government or 
expert commissions to determine a specific emission standard for a certain field of 
environmental protection by means of binding planning directives or in the form of a 
programme which ensures an acceptable quality standard.  An example of such a quality 
standard is that local authorities may determine whether water is clean enough for 
swimming purposes.  The prerequisite is that the water may not contain any detrimental 
pollutants which could cause harm to people in one or other way. Another quality standard 
is the aim to reduce harmful emissions into the air by half at a specific future date or to 
prohibit the emission of specific substances altogether. Even the goal to maintain the status 
quo with the aim that a specific level of emissions should not further deteriorate constitutes 
a quality standard.  
The legal flexibility of planning law distinguishes these environmental quality standards 
from other regulatory measures.  At the stage of formulating the quality standards, the initial 
economic premises as well as the long-term economic goals can be taken into account.
63 
The realisation of such quality goals are just as flexible. It can take on the form of a legally 
binding goal, a political programme with a specific aim or a goal set on the basis of 
scientific or expert knowledge.  Lately specific industries often take the initiative themselves 
to participate in orderly market agreements with regard to quality standards for 
environmental protection, sometimes even in the form of unilateral self-binding 
declarations.  This form of quality standard realisation has gained in importance.  However, 
it is controversial whether such declarations are of a legally binding nature and whether 
they are suitable to relieve the state from its responsibility for environmental matters.  
Should the industry indeed meet these orderly market agreements or unilateral declarations 
with regard to quality standards, they could contribute substantially to effectively improve 
environmental protection.  What is of importance for the relation  
62  For a discussion, see BUND Sachstandsbericht; SRU Umweltgutachten 129 ff.  
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between environmental protection and economic development is that the costs due to 
environmental quality standards are not only calculated by the state but also by those 
causing environmental harm on the basis of the quality goals they voluntarily set for 
themselves.  
8 Conclusion  
To conclude, the responsibility of the Rechtsstaat has not been defined in an acceptable 
manner, neither with regard to its responsibility for environmental protection nor with regard 
to its responsibility for sustainable development.  This is a characteristic feature of 
economic development based on high technology and which is based upon legislative or 
socio-political decisions to a great extent.  In a free-market system which is based upon 
fundamental rights of participants in economic life, the relation of the state's responsibility 
for environmental protection, on the one hand, and economic development, on the other, 
can be summarised with the following remarks:  
• We should analyse disputes which constitute an environmental risk on the basis of 
existing national law as well as European Community law, treating it as a closely 
interrelated legal network.  All provisions and rules which may contribute to solve 
the environmental risk in legal terms should be taken into account.  If such an 
analysis would lead to the conclusion that the detrimental consequences in the case 
of environmental damage exceed the possibilities of legal restitution the hazardous 
activity should be regarded as unlawful.  It is the responsibility of the Rechtsstaat to 
address the problem of environmental risks and potential damages according to the 
precautionary principle.  
 
• A comparable responsibility of the Rechtsstaat for economic development in such a 
general and encompassing sense does not exist.  This is due to the fact that each 
state takes decisions about its economic system in a sovereign manner and shapes 
the economic, employment and social welfare legislation to fit its  
 
 
 
63  Fürst ea Umweltqualitätsziele.  For a critical evaluation of loopholes to abuse the quality standards, 
see Lübbe 1996 Zeitschrift für Umweltrecht 64.  
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national requirements.  However, a prerequisite for the economic system of a 
Rechtsstaat is that state interference in the economic life - despite national economic 
interests - is always subject to the fundamental rights of those who participate in 
commerce.  
•  An irrefutable interrelationship exits between environmental protection and economic 
development in state politics. In order to give effect to the precautionary principle, the 
state already has to scrutinise the environmental impact of its economic policy at the 
stage of planning it.  In other words, the precautionary principle not only has a 
regulatory character but also a planning-law dimension.
64 
Thus one can no longer 
distinguish between economic planning and environmental planning which is subject 
to the precautionary principle in a Rechtsstaat.  
64  In terms of European environmental law, the environmental impact assessment should also apply 
with regard to local and state planning law - see EC Directive 85/337.  
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